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Race is becoming an increasingly common lens through which biomedical research-ers are studying the relevance of genes to 
group predispositions that may a!ect disease sus-
ceptibility and drug response.  These investiga-
tions contravene decades of research in the natu-
ral and social sciences demonstrating that social 
categories of race have little genetic significance.1 
Nevertheless, a resounding debate has ensued over 
the utility of race in biomedical research — par-
ticularly as new drugs claiming to serve particu-
lar racial populations enter the marketplace.  Now 
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
approved BiDil as the first race-specific treatment 
despite conflicting evidence and unsettled debates, 
is there a way for federal regulators to promote 
research that may address minority health con-
cerns without giving undue credence to the dan-
gerous idea that social understandings of race are 
genetically relevant?  It may be useful for the FDA 
to turn to an area with experience negotiating such 
dilemmas — constitutional law — and its approach 
— strict scrutiny — to help guide when and under 
which circumstances government should give e!ect 
to racial categories in biomedicine.  
Controversy over the Relevance of Race to 
Biomedical Research 
Much of the 20th century’s struggles around race 
involved challenging the problematic link often made 
between social categories of race and presumptions 
surrounding groups’ heritable predispositions.  Yet new 
research looking at the genetic underpinnings of dis-
ease, health outcomes, and drug response is rethinking 
this approach, giving renewed credence to arguments 
suggesting that social categories of race reflect mean-
ingful genetic di!erences.  Though there is consider-
able evidence demonstrating the social determinants 
that give rise to racial disparities in health outcomes,2 
research using race as a proxy for groups’ biological 
predispositions is becoming a remarkable trend at the 
intersection of population genetics and biomedical 
research.  Some argue this will dramatically reshape 
clinical interactions and health care delivery.3
This has stirred a heated debate in scientific and bio-
ethical communities over when and how race should 
be used in biomedical research.  Those supporting the 
use of race and ancestral background point to at least 
three sets of studies in population genetics that osten-
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sibly show significant genetic variation both within 
racial and ethnic subpopulations and among the five 
main racial groups defined by continental ancestry.4 
First, population genetic data from indigenous groups 
have enabled researchers to construct ancestral tree 
diagrams that presumptively show that human genetic 
diversity can be apportioned along five major branches 
that roughly correspond to the five main continents.5 
Second, multi-locus genetic data and cluster analy-
ses have resulted in genetic delineations that roughly 
map onto self-identified racial groups and continental 
ancestry.6  Third, researchers have shown that alleles 
(genetic variants) with a frequency of 20% or more 
in one racial group are likely to appear in others, but 
alleles appearing less frequently are more likely to be 
contained within the racial group.7  Since Africans have 
greater genetic variability but more low-frequency 
alleles, race-specific genetic variants are deemed to be 
more common among this group.  This “indicate[s] 
that the frequency of variant alleles underlying disease 
or normal phenotypes can vary substantially among 
racial groups, leading to di!erences in the frequency 
of the phenotype themselves.”8
While these studies give the appearance of a cor-
relation between certain genes and social categories 
of race, there has been a growing critique concerning 
how these studies might reify rather than reveal race 
as a genetic category.  Evolutionary geneticist James 
L. Graves has pointed out how physical anthropolo-
gists and geneticists have repeatedly demonstrated the 
principle of discordance since the 1940s: that popula-
tions’ physical features and genetic variations do not 
consistently correlate with one another.  Graves notes 
that “if one attempts to take multiple physical char-
acters to define racial groups, you arrive at categori-
zations that are not indicative of their evolutionary 
history.”9  And, in a related critique, physical anthro-
pologist Deborah Bolnick has raised important ques-
tions concerning the methods used to infer individual 
ancestry from genetic data — methods that are also 
used to support arguments that social understandings 
of race are reflected in populations’ underlying genetic 
structures.10 With regards to two oft-cited articles 
by Noah Rosenburg et al. and Michael Bamshad et 
al. that use the computer program structure to iden-
tify genetic clusters that correspond with geographic 
origin, Bolnick shows how the evidence for genetic 
clustering around ancestry does not arise organically 
out of the data but depends heavily  upon a series of 
questionable assumptions — both from the underly-
ing program and its users.11 
Others have also raised serious doubts as to whether 
race, as a social category, is significant to genomic 
research.  Racially targeted therapies are based upon 
the presumption that the frequencies of alleles that 
influence drug e"cacy are meaningfully and predict-
ably di!erent for each race.  The science supporting 
this conclusion, however, is far from conclusive.  For 
example, where microsatellite loci have been used to 
ground classifications that approximate continental 
groups, the results have been questioned:
[It] depends in part on the cumulative e!ect of 
minor di!erences in the frequencies of common 
alleles and in part on the e!ect of population 
specific alleles.  In neither case is it apparent 
that such di!erences have relevance for traits 
that are important to health.  Most population-
specific microsatellite alleles are unlikely to be 
functional; rather, like a last name, they merely 
help to verify the geographic origin of a person’s 
ancestry.12
Moreover, some have argued that allele frequency may 
not be particularly relevant to pursuing a genetic basis 
for racial categorizations in biomedical sciences.  Using 
allele frequencies to categorize people is arguably “not 
the same as apportioning the whole of human diversity 
into medically relevant categories.  The more germane 
outcome — that the sets of common functional poly-
morphisms are distributed in discrete racial catego-
ries — has not been demonstrated.”13  Most population 
geneticists continue to agree that the vast majority of 
all genetic variation occurs within continental popula-
tions, not between them.14 
Those who question the utility of race to genomic 
research are not only troubled by what they perceive to 
be inconclusive and unpersuasive science, but also by 
the social harms that may result when social catego-
ries of race are prematurely accepted as reflecting real 
genetic divisions among humans.  What is particularly 
troublesome for these commentators is the extent to 
which minorities in general, and African Americans 
in particular, are assumed to be genetically predis-
posed to a remarkably high number of chronic dis-
eases when little genetic data has been systematically 
analyzed and various social and environmental factors 
remain inextricably intertwined.  To many, the recent 
trend within the biomedical sciences to demonstrate 
how blacks are genetically predisposed to adverse 
health outcomes creates conditions where society 
stops looking at the often discriminatory environmen-
tal and structural conditions that strongly correlate 
with these health disparities.  Troy Duster notes that 
using social categories such as race as an explanatory 
proxy for genetic di!erences in health outcomes cre-
ates a “complex feedback loop and interaction e!ect 
between phenotype and social practices related to that 
race, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology • fall 2008  493
Osagie K. Obasogie
phenotype…[that is] poised to exert a cascading e!ect 
— resinscribing taxonomies of race across a broad 
range of scientific practices and fields.”15 
These debates are as robust as any contemporary 
discussion in the biomedical sciences.  Any reason-
able, science-driven resolution or consensus will 
require decades of clinical research supported by mil-
lions of dollars.  In the meantime, it is not enough to 
say that this research should categorically stop given 
the explosive nature of this conversation; not pursuing 
race-based medicines may leave the most vulnerable 
populations without life-saving or life-improving med-
ications.  On the other hand, it is similarly important 
to grapple with the gruesome historical relationship 
science has had with race and, in particular, the real 
threat to minority communities when their adverse 
social or health outcomes are discussed as a function 
of who they are.  
The Emerging Racial Pharmacy
In the midst of these debates, the bricks and mortar 
of the racial pharmacy are being put into place.  BiDil, 
a drug patented and marketed by NitroMed to treat 
African American heart failure, arrived on the scene 
in June 2005 as the first drug to receive FDA approval 
for treating a specific racial group.  
BiDil has been widely cited as exemplifying a break-
through in personalized medicine.  Though not a phar-
macogenomic product per se, BiDil lends credibility 
to race based genomic research by advancing the logic 
that it is indeed possible, if not preferable, to use race 
as a presumptively genetic marker to segment drug 
markets.  As the first drug patented as race-specific 
(a legal claim about race and genetics), the first to be 
approved by the federal government as race-specific 
(a state claim about race and genetics) and the first to 
be marketed as race specific (an economic claim about 
race and genetics), BiDil represents a remarkable step 
forward in giving credence to the idea that social cate-
gories of race can be an appropriate proxy for yet to be 
known genes that are both unique to particular racial 
groups and the cause of specific health outcomes.  
The circumstantial evidence supporting BiDil’s 
race specific claims may be persuasive to some but is 
far from conclusive.  Though BiDil, a pill containing 
hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate, had been tested 
in two earlier clinical trials (V-HeFT I and V-HeFT 
II), its FDA approval was propelled in large part by 
the African-American Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT). 
This trial only enrolled patients that self-identified as 
Black16 — an unorthodox decision “based on observa-
tions of di!erences in prevalence, risk, profiles, causa-
tion, disease severity, outcomes, and response to ther-
apy between black patients and white patients with 
heart failure.”17  Though social scientists question the 
methodological soundness of research findings relying 
solely on self-identified race,18 the A-HeFT research-
ers found the trial results to be promising: the placebo 
group experienced a significantly higher mortality 
rate and lower quality of life than patients using BiDil, 
suggesting that BiDil works di!erently in Blacks than 
other groups.  Nonetheless, many have raised seri-
ous concerns as to whether a clinical trial that only 
included blacks can show, as a matter of science, that 
they respond di!erently to a drug than other racial 
groups.
A central concern here is as much about how people 
think about race and racial disparities as it is about 
particular health outcomes.  BiDil’s ostensible e!ec-
tiveness notwithstanding, the logic underpinning its 
arrival worries many — particularly in the context of 
inconclusive research over the utility of race as a pre-
dictive category for drug response.  Health care prac-
tices that fixate on molecular and genetic di!erences 
as an explanation for racial disparities in health may 
prematurely deflect attention from known social deter-
minants of health: economic class, social conditions, 
and environmental factors among others.  Allowing 
markets to move this discussion to local pharmacies 
before scientists can come to some reasonable con-
sensus may be premature; some blacks with heart 
failure may individually benefit from BiDil, but the 
black community as a whole may su!er if this leads to 
Steven Nissen noted that the committee “us[ed] self-identified race as a 
surrogate for genomics” when they advised the FDA to approve BiDil’s race-
specific indication.  This is only one example of how race as an entrée to 
personalized medicines is becoming an increasingly important consideration 
for federal regulators and why the FDA should prepare for what many predict 
will be nothing short of a revolution in how we approach health care.
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an uncritical acceptance that resuscitates the danger-
ous idea that di!erences in phenotype, their adherent 
social meanings, and racial disparities in health out-
comes are observable at a molecular level.  
Commentaries on BiDil and the future of race-spe-
cific medicines have been predictably heated.  Some 
proponents of race-based therapies concede that race 
is an imprecise if not crude marker for understanding 
genetic variance, yet ultimately find it to be a useful 
proxy until specific genetic markers become available 
to treat genotypes rather than phenotypes.19  Others 
have noted both the cultural and economic di"cul-
ties of transcending race once it has been accepted as 
an explanatory factor in health outcomes and medi-
cal treatment.  Duster notes that race as an “interim 
solution” can still do much harm once given scientific 
legitimacy.20  And, after noting the market incentives 
leading to BiDil’s development,21 M. Gregg Bloche 
argues that pharmaceutical firms with patent protec-
tion and regulatory approval for race-specific medi-
cines have little incentive to sponsor research aimed 
at finding the relevant genetic variations that would 
obviate their previous research and devalue their intel-
lectual property.22 Still others hypothesize that blacks 
may have a genetic predisposition towards nitric oxide 
deficiency that BiDil can address.23 
Though these commentaries have provoked much 
thought and discussion, they have largely not o!ered 
a way to balance the pragmatic need to remain open 
to potentially beneficial race-based medicines with 
the need to minimize misleading conversations over 
the genetic relevance of race.  Is there a way for public 
policy to take into account both the potential health 
benefits of race-specific drugs and the attendant social 
risks of geneticizing race? 
Strict Scrutiny as a Regulatory Model
Despite ongoing investigations, BiDil’s effective-
ness has not been linked to any genetic mechanism. 
Remarkably, this did not prevent BiDil’s clinical trial 
results and race-specific new drug application from 
being interpreted as such.  Steven Nissen, chair of 
the FDA’s Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory 
Committee, noted that the committee “us[ed] self-
identified race as a surrogate for genomics”24 when 
they advised the FDA to approve BiDil’s race-specific 
indication.  This is only one example of how race as 
an entrée to personalized medicines is becoming an 
increasingly important consideration for federal regu-
lators and why the FDA should prepare for what many 
predict will be nothing short of a revolution in how we 
approach health care.25 
Currently, the FDA is without formal regulations or 
procedures on how to review new drug applications 
that target specific races beyond its traditional focus on 
safety and e"cacy, which are informed almost exclu-
sively by clinical observations.26  This limited scope 
may lead FDA o"cials to miss key social and ethi-
cal concerns that are not immediately demonstrable 
in a clinical context — particularly when biotechno-
logical innovations are involved.  Take as an example 
the FDA’s claim of regulatory authority over human 
reproductive cloning.27  Ostensibly, if someone were 
to attempt to clone a human being and demonstrated 
that it could be performed safely and e!ectively, then 
the FDA could approve the procedure.  But, this 
mandate does not necessarily address broader social 
concerns over human reproductive cloning that exist 
regardless of how safe or e!ective the procedure may 
be.  This is but one example of how biotechnology 
requires a di!erent sensitivity and sensibility because 
of its unprecedented power to reshape basic human 
relationships.  
To understand how government can best negoti-
ate this growing relationship between biotechnology 
and race, constitutional law may o!er a bit of guid-
ance.  In areas such as employment and education, 
the United States Supreme Court has subjected the 
state’s use and approval of racial categories, even for 
benign purposes, to close examination.  The applica-
tion of this doctrine, known as strict scrutiny, came 
out of a concern that federal and state governments 
should neither create nor enforce illegitimate racial 
classifications that may prove to be discriminatory or 
unduly burdensome given the troublesome context of 
American race relations.  But, strict scrutiny also rec-
ognizes that some racial classifications may not only be 
helpful, but essential to address ongoing inequalities. 
Strict scrutiny as applied to race developed in the mid- 
20th century as a function of the 14th Amendment’s 
Equal Protection jurisprudence, which had an original 
“pervading purpose…[to promote] the freedom of the 
slave race, the security and establishment of freedom, 
and the protection of [Blacks] from the oppressions of 
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion 
over him.”28  Though Equal Protection’s contours have 
certainly changed since the Supreme Court o!ered 
this language in 1873, it is important to note that this 
idea of giving state-enforced racial categories an extra 
level of scrutiny comes out of a longstanding commit-
ment to racial equality and remedying past injustices. 
Strict scrutiny does not hold that all racial classi-
fications are impermissible per se, but only that they 
should raise of our suspicion.  In order to prevent 
harmful or needless racial categorizations, strict scru-
tiny requires that when the state gets into the busi-
ness of racially classifying individuals, these categories 
should be “narrowly tailored to further compelling 
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state interests.”29  The state has the burden to demon-
strate that its purpose is significant, non-discrimina-
tory, and not exploitive.  As the Supreme Court notes 
in Richmond v. J. A. Croson, a case on the constitu-
tionality of so called “minority business set asides,” the 
purpose of strict scrutiny is to ensure that government 
is “pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of 
a highly suspect tool.”30  This has led to a few remark-
able balancing acts in terms of how public entities use 
racial categories in their daily practices, even when 
these practices may benefit minority populations.  For 
example, in the a"rmative action context, universities 
can take race into account when reviewing applica-
tions for the purpose of increasing racial diversity, but 
may not use quotas.
As the gatekeeper standing between these powerful 
technologies and their public impact, strict scrutiny 
highlights a critical point that the FDA should con-
sider when reviewing pharmacogenomic and other 
personalized medicines: race is di!erent.  The Rich-
mond Court aptly notes that “classifications based on 
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm...[;] they may 
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead 
to a politics of racial hostility.”31  The appropriate 
use of race specific treatments must not only look at 
“safety” and “e"cacy” in a clinical or statistical sense, 
but should be similarly rigorous in its examination of 
social responsibility.  Put di!erently, the use of race in 
biomedicine should be held to a heightened standard 
of proven e"cacy and be narrowly tailored — that is, 
used only when better proxies such as specific genetic 
markers are not available.  A key concern with the use 
of racial indications in biomedicine, as with other cat-
egorizations in Constitutional law, is that they can be 
both over and under inclusive. Racial indications may 
be overinclusive, for example, by channeling too many 
Blacks with heart failure towards BiDil when they 
might fare better through other treatments. These 
very same indications may also be underinclusive by 
“missing” the substantial number of non-Black heart 
failure patients who may benefit from BiDil in that 
their doctors may not think to prescribe the medica-
tion to them.  This additional layer of oversight can 
apply to help ensure that race-specific drug claims 
meet minorities’ needs in compelling and meaningful 
ways and are not irresponsibly driven by commercial 
desires.  It can also help make sure that the individuals 
that benefit the most from the drug continue to have 
unimpeded access to it.
Since there is no precedent for how Equal Protec-
tion should inform the use of race in biomedicine, a 
number of commentators have discussed its possible 
relevance.  Erik Lillquist and Charles Sullivan have 
taken an exhaustive look at the legal relevance of this 
issue, including how Equal Protection jurisprudence 
might inform the development of race-based medi-
cines and the use of racially exclusive clinical trials.32 
Jonathan Kahn draws upon Equal Protection juris-
prudence to advocate developing mechanisms within 
clinical and biomedical research that resists conflating 
genetic categories of population with social categories 
of race while requiring a “tight fit” when such claims 
are made.33  And Dorothy Roberts draws upon Equal 
Protection norms to suggest a social justice frame-
work that encourages researchers to use racial catego-
ries to combat health disparities, but resists its use as 
a biological category to prevent dangerous racial ideas 
from being reinforced.34 
Each of these and other contributions are useful in 
helping us think through the issues that arise when 
race and biotechnological claims arise. They are united 
by an e!ort to use Equal Protection norms and com-
mitments to improve clinicians’ and researchers’ use 
of race in their professional capacities.  But perhaps 
broader framings are similarly appropriate as strict 
scrutiny is a regulatory approach that is designed to 
examine whether the state is using racial categories 
appropriately in light of constitutional mandates, not 
only as an instrument that may suggest professional or 
ethical guidelines.  Thus, analogizing courts’ judicial 
oversight to a normative scheme of clinical or research 
best practices may not fully leverage strict scrutiny’s 
broad regulatory spirit.   
David Winicko! and I have drawn upon strict scru-
tiny to propose an oversight mechanism whereby 
“race-specific indications should be rejected unless 
Given the vigorous and unsettled debate concerning the genetic relevance 
of race, the state has a strong interest in approving the use of race-specific 
indications only when they are used cautiously, are supported by robust 
scientific studies, and are not simply used as a convenient proxy.
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clinical trials can demonstrate convincingly that the 
drugs are both better than existing treatments for a 
specified group and no better than existing treatments 
for non-specified groups.”35  This approach is designed 
to ensure that the evidence supporting race-specific 
indications is robust and accessible 
to the most appropriate groups. 
Yet, another promising avenue to 
introduce a strict scrutiny analysis 
may be through rethinking the role 
of FDA advisory committees.  
FDA advisory committees are 
routinely used to give expert advice 
on new drug applications to assist 
the regulatory process and boost 
the credibility of the FDA’s decision on whether to 
allow a drug to become publicly available.36 And, as 
demonstrated by the troubling “race as a surrogate 
for genomics” comments made by the chair of the 
FDA advisory committee that recommended BiDil’s 
approval with a race-specific indication, the framing 
of these committees’ inquiry can either a"rm or act as 
a check against certain shortcomings within the nar-
row review of new drug applications that focus largely 
on safety and e"cacy.   
While these committees are typically composed of 
physicians, scientists, and statisticians with expertise 
relevant to the drug or device under review, an advi-
sory committee that uses a strict scrutiny framework to 
review any new drug that proposes a race-specific indi-
cation could be a remarkable addition.  Once a general 
finding of safety and e"cacy is made, this committee 
would focus on whether a race specific indication is 
appropriate by weighing the merits of approving the 
drug with or without the race-specific label.  Much 
of this can be meaningfully guided by strict scrutiny 
principles: questioning whether there is a compelling 
state interest for a race-specific indication (an ongo-
ing health disparity, the ine!ectiveness of other treat- 
ments, etc.) and if the use of race is narrowly tailored 
such that race is not uncritically framed by government 
as a genetic variable while ensuring that other potential 
beneficiaries are not denied access.  These committee 
members (social scientists, lawyers, bioethicists, and 
others) could play a critical role in assessing the social 
impact of a proposed racial indication relative to its 
benefits — including whether it promotes unfounded 
genetic theories of racial di!erence.  Though ultimate 
approval of such drugs would remain with the FDA, 
much of the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate-
ness of state-enforced racial indications could be miti-
gated if these committees’ decisions concerning the 
use of race indications enjoyed substantial deference.  
Conclusion
Given the vigorous and unsettled debate concerning 
the genetic relevance of race, the state has a strong 
interest in approving the use of race-specific indica-
tions only when they are used cautiously, are sup-
ported by robust scientific studies, and are not simply 
used as a convenient proxy.   Like its role in Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence, this article proposes strict scru-
tiny as a regulatory guidepost for reviewing new drugs 
seeking race-specific labels to, as the Richmond Court 
notes, “smoke out illegitimate uses of race.”37  Whether 
BiDil itself could survive such scrutiny depends heav-
ily upon how this additional form of oversight is devel-
oped and implemented.  But, the take-home message 
is that the use of racial categories in medicine will 
require remarkable sensitivity and responsibility on 
the part of corporations, government, clinicians, and 
consumers.  As a result, it may very well be wise for 
us to have a deeper appreciation for how the battles 
waged to a!ord racial minorities Equal Protection of 
the laws can extend this same sentiment to medical 
research and health care.   
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